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TA R A S  F E D I R K O
Liberalism in fragments: oligarchy and 
the liberal subject in Ukrainian news 
journalism
This article explores the place of liberal subjectivity in the professional culture of Ukrainian journalists to 
analyse how ideas originating in contexts of hegemonic liberalism at the core of the global capitalist system, 
are taken up on its postsocialist margins. I outline how certain Anglo‐ American notions of good journalistic 
practice, which encode traits of liberal subjectivity, are borrowed and elaborated by a Western‐ funded move-
ment for an anti‐ oligarchic liberal media reform in Ukraine. These ideals are then taken up within oligarch‐ 
controlled media, a context that the reformers see as inimical to liberalism. Through an ethnographic portrait 
of an editor‐ censor at a major oligarch‐ owned TV channel in Ukraine, I analyse how these professional ideals 
simultaneously uphold oligarchic patronage and extend the reach of liberal politics in Ukraine. This reveals 
how in the force field of global capitalism both the reformers and those whom they seek to reform are part of 
the same, contradictory and fractured, liberal formation. I propose that to better understand cases like this, we 
need to learn to see liberalism in fragments: as always partial and incomplete and as constituted by multiple 
elements.
Key words  journalism, oligarchy, liberalism, liberal subject, Ukraine
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Liberalism is everywhere in contemporary anthropology, yet almost everywhere it 
seems out of focus: a blurred background of ‘Western culture’ against which ethnog-
raphers examine the world of ethnographic difference (cf. Candea 2021; Fedirko et al. 
2021; Mazzarella 2018; Schiller 2015). Only relatively recently have anthropologists 
turned the ethnographic lens onto liberalism itself, exploring both contexts in which 
hegemonic liberalism constitutes common political sense and those where liberal proj-
ects can be more clearly seen as narrow mobilisations coalescing around specific group 
interests (Dzenovska 2018; Englund 2011; Hadley 2010; Mazzarella 2018; Schiller 
2013). To contribute to this growing literature and our special collection’s efforts to 
systematise it for purposes of anthropological comparison, this article analyses a non‐ 
hegemonic, minoritarian form of ‘media liberalism’ at the postsocialist semi‐ periphery 
of the global capitalist system. I explore how ideals of good professional practice in 
Ukrainian news reporting encode certain elements of liberal subjectivity; how they are 
‘imported’ and elaborated in the context of a transnationally connected movement for 
an anti‐ oligarchic liberal reform of Ukrainian journalism; and how they are taken up, 
reworked and reproduced within oligarch‐ controlled media – a context that avowed 
liberal reformers in Ukraine see as inimical to liberal governance, individual freedom 
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and vocational public service. In so doing, I investigate the tensions between liberalism 
as ideology and liberalism as a set of institutions in a context where a combination of 
Western‐ supported projects of building liberal democracy to secure the margins of 
the ‘empire of capital’ (Yurchenko 2017) come into conflict with political‐ economic 
arrangements of oligarchic patronage through which the emergent postsocialist bour-
geoisie has become integrated into this ‘empire’.
Anthropologists of European postsocialisms have argued that the ‘unmaking’ of 
state socialism was a complex, path‐ dependent and open‐ ended transformation, rather 
than a linear transition to liberal democracy and capitalism (for an overview, see Rogers 
and Verdery 2013). Yet, in Ukraine and across the broader postsocialist region (e.g. 
in Serbia, Greenberg 2014), local intelligentsia, university students and middle‐ class 
professionals embraced the possibility of transitioning to liberalism as a comprehen-
sive, deliberate project of individual and collective change. They relied on Western 
financial and political backing, and allied with local national‐ democratic parties origi-
nally formed by late‐ Soviet dissidents and reformers, to bring Ukraine into the fold of 
liberal modernity exemplified by the Euro‐ Atlantic order. They sought to transform 
Ukraine’s political system and culture, including by reforming the journalistic profes-
sion, so as to guarantee rule of law, protect human rights and promote capitalist mar-
kets free from state interference and oligarchic privilege. These efforts have grounded 
liberal ideology – part‐ developed locally, part‐ imported thanks to Western ‘technical 
advisers’ and project funding – in a set of activist organisations that have regularly 
supplied new recruits for Western‐ oriented political parties, but had only intermittent 
success in realising their programme, and enjoy rather limited public legitimacy. At the 
same time, however, elaborated within this milieu, elements of this liberalism have had 
a more diffuse, fragmentary influence beyond their main ‘organisational base’ in the 
civil society.
Ukrainian journalism is exemplary in this regard. Over the past two decades 
in Ukraine, in response to what many journalists perceive as a deepening crisis of 
professional legitimacy (cf. Roudakova 2017), there has emerged a movement for a 
moral‐ professional reform of the journalistic profession. This movement has opposed 
censorship and political instrumentalisation of news by media owners and politicians, 
as well as various forms of unprofessional or unethical behaviour among journalists 
themselves. It has borrowed from Anglo‐ American occupational ideals of news-
work as defined by ‘balanced objectivity’, impartiality and collective self‐ regulation 
(Bishara 2013; Lebovic 2016; Schudson 1981) to formulate standards of professional 
conduct that extoll journalistic autonomy and mandate vigilance to possible signs 
of outside influence or interference. These standards encapsulate visions of individ-
uality, freedom, authentic creativity and individual rationality as a means of achiev-
ing a broader public good, which have long been recognised as centrepieces of the 
broad liberal tradition in the West. In Ukraine, this genealogical tradition has been 
refracted through the humanism and commitment to public service of the late‐ Soviet 
intelligentsia (Roudakova 2017; Tromly 2014), and later influences from the West, for 
instance through British and American‐ backed skills development projects that sought 
to develop ‘independent media’ as a way of democratising Ukraine (cf. Wedel 1998). 
According to media watchdogs leading the movement, the mainstream oligarch‐ owned 
media use news as instruments for securing the political and economic power of their 
owners. Many of my interlocutors among liberal media workers in Kyiv find that jour-
nalists who work for such media are complicit in upholding the oligarchic system that 
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undermines the project of liberal modernisation. They dismiss fellow reporters and 
editors at the mainstream media as unfree, unprofessional and unworthy of protection 
under freedom of speech law. Nevertheless, as my ethnography demonstrates, liberal 
ideals of journalistic professionalism live on within such oligarchic media in surprising 
ways, prompting us to ask what form media liberalism takes beyond the boundaries of 
the organised reform movement.
This article builds on 15 months of fieldwork in Kyiv (in 2017– 18, and then in 2019 
and 2020), and more than 24 months of supplementary digital ethnography, during 
which I researched some of the key organisations in the media reform movement and 
those whom they oppose. My aim here is to explore how a vision of professional sub-
ject central to this project of liberal reform reproduces certain traits of liberal subjectiv-
ity, and how it is taken up and transformed in a context relatively removed from what 
the reformers themselves would consider a good example of professional journalism. 
I focus on a case of an editor (whom I call Svitlana) at an oligarch‐ owned television 
channel who oversees the production of news that she herself admits services the inter-
ests of her channel’s owner. She is an editor whom liberal journalists in Kyiv would be 
quick to dismiss as an unfree subject, marred by compromise and lacking the ability 
to govern herself in accordance with the norms of her profession. Exploring in turn 
Svitlana’s narrative of herself as a professional, her interactions with young trainees at a 
private journalism school, and her explanations for practices that liberals would iden-
tify as un‐ free speech, I demonstrate how the liberal subject – or rather, a liberal subject 
– ‘lives’ through Svitlana’s teaching, her editorial work, as well as her justification of 
routine censorship that she oversaw at her TV channel.
This case of journalistic subjectivity in Ukraine illustrates a more general process 
of re‐ contextualisation of liberal idea(l)s transferred from hegemonic liberal formations 
at the core of the global capitalist system to its postsocialist margins where liberalism 
is a minoritarian affair. It illuminates how such ideas are elaborated in response to local 
political‐ economic conditions, and embedded within radically different institutional 
contexts: in this case, a movement for a modernising, anti‐ oligarchic liberal media 
reform and an oligarchic media organisation opposed by this movement. Both con-
texts, constituted by an ongoing struggle between groups with distinct interests and 
positions in Ukraine’s political economy, are connected as part of the same unevenly 
institutionalised, heterogeneous and fragmented liberal formation. In it, organised, 
densely institutionalised projects of liberation coexist in a functional relation with rad-
ically different elaborations of the same liberal ideas that result in distinct forms of 
life that ‘professional’ liberals do not recognise as their own. Ultimately, I argue that 
moving liberalism from the background of the anthropological imagination into its 
focus, so that we can examine and critique it in all its meaningful differences, means 
recognising that although liberalism is everywhere, it is everywhere in fragments.
P e r i p h e r a l  l i b e r a l i s m  i n  U k r a i n e
Liberalism and neoliberalism have never been hegemonic in Ukraine in the ways they 
have in Western Europe (Gorbach n.d.). On the one hand, the newly independent 
Ukrainian state quickly put in place the constitutional trappings of a liberal democ-
racy. On the other, throughout the country’s first post‐ Soviet decade, ‘civil liberties 
were frequently violated and incumbents routinely abused or manipulated democratic 
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procedures’ (Levitsky and Way 2002: 52), leaving political scientists to argue about 
the character of the country’s political regime. With the important exceptions of the 
late Kuchma (1999– 2004) and Yanukovych (2010– 2014) presidencies, governments 
balanced between shielding their electoral bases from the consequences of marketisa-
tion, and adopting selective policies of political and economic liberalisation under pres-
sure from the IMF, US government and other donors. Either way, policies were often 
designed to favour various patronage pyramids competing over the control of state 
property and contracts, and to insulate domestic oligarchic capital from foreign com-
petition (Kudelia 2012; Ishchenko and Yurchenko 2019; Matuszak 2012; Yurchenko 
2017). Mikhailo Minakov and Matthew Rojanski have argued that the contradictions 
between the liberal‐ democratic institutions and ‘oligarch‐ controlled distribution of 
power and resources’ have
yielded two revolutionary cycles, spanning roughly 1992– 2004 and 2005– 2014. 
During each of these cycles, a period of popularly supported democratic reforms 
was soon displaced by simulated democracy, driven essentially by oligarchic 
competition and then, later, by authoritarian consolidation, resulting in civic 
protests and eventual regime change, resetting the cycle. (2018: np)
This analysis helps to place Ukrainian liberals in their structural context. Throughout 
the two revolutionary cycles described by Minakov and Rojanski, and especially since 
2004, there has developed a loose bloc of liberal civil society organisations (constituted 
predominantly by Western‐ funded policy‐ oriented think‐ tanks, watchdog and activist 
organisations), with sections of middle‐ class professionals, intelligentsia and entrepre-
neurs (cf. Ishchenko 2019). They took active part in organising both Maidan revolu-
tions and reaped some of the immediate benefits from Ukraine’s post‐ revolutionary 
transformations: closer ties the EU and the USA; opening of government positions 
to revolutionary elites and official promotion of an anti‐ Soviet, and more recently 
anti‐ Russian Ukrainian identity; and memory politics which increased the cultural 
influence of Ukrainian‐ speaking intelligentsia (cf. Zhuravlev and Ishchenko 2020; 
Yurchuk 2020). This bloc has historically allied in a ‘national‐ democratic’ coalition 
with Western‐ oriented nationalists and the democratic parties that had emerged from 
the late‐ Soviet Rukh movement. Through the country’s 30 years of independence, this 
coalition had significant influence on the country’s cultural and minorities policy, but 
was in power only intermittently (Gorbach n.d.) as a result of the 2004 and 2013– 14 
revolutions. After the 2013– 14 ‘Euromaidan’ revolution, this coalition has extended to 
include emerging far‐ right groups that played a crucial role the revolutionary escala-
tion and the early period of anti‐ separatist mobilisation in eastern Ukraine (Ishchenko 
2020).
Oligarchic competition has profoundly shaped both post‐ 2014 presidential admin-
istrations. Nevertheless, the liberal have navigated their way into Kyiv’s corridors of 
power as elected parliamentarians, political appointees, grant‐ paid advisers to the 
executive and policy lobbyists. They promote campaigns and policies for free market, 
government accountability and curbing of the political power of Ukrainian oligarchic 
capital, which Western governments and lenders demanded of Ukraine as a condition 
of their support in the context of Ukraine’s double economic and military crisis after 
2014. At the same time, the exclusionary character of post‐ revolutionary nationalism 
among both liberals and their ‘national‐ democratic’ allies, and the disproportionate 
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adverse effect of liberal economic policies on poorer Ukrainians, have ensured that the 
liberals’ agenda lacks broad popular legitimacy (see Zhuravlev and Ishchenko 2020: 
231– 2; also Fedirko and Aryal 2020).
O l i g a r c h y  a n d  t h e  m e d i a
The Ukrainian journalistic profession has played a particular role in the complicated 
story of this part‐ imported, part‐ vernacular minoritarian liberalism. While the demise 
of the USSR initiated a short period of growth for news media in Ukraine, the ensu-
ing economic crisis undermined their advertising revenues and editorial autonomy 
(Ryabinska 2017; cf. Roudakova 2009; Koltsova 2006). Some outlets, especially in 
radio and print media, turned to illicitly selling their news coverage to politicians and 
the emerging private businesses to make up for the shortfall left by meagre advertis-
ing revenues (Roudakova 2009, 2017). State‐ owned media soon became part of the 
‘administrative resource’ of national and local authorities (cf. Ledeneva 2006). Others, 
predominantly in the more capital‐ intensive commercial TV, came under the control 
of, or were established by, oligarchic patrons who used them to ‘defend’ and expand 
their industrial assets (Yurchenko 2017), as a result of which commercial broadcasters 
became a ground for anti‐ oligarchic mobilisations from which a number of liberal pol-
iticians emerged.
Today the Ukrainian media landscape is extremely dynamic: new online and 
broadcast media emerge every year. Yet, most of the media professionals I interviewed 
in Kyiv insisted that there is ‘no media market’ to speak of, for the size of advertising 
demand is insufficient to support the numerous broadcasters, most of which are cross‐ 
subsidised by their owners’ industrial ventures. According to official statistics, most 
TV broadcasters have been deeply loss‐ making since the 2008 financial crisis and until 
at least until 2016;1 public announcements by senior media executives and my inter-
views confirm this. According to one estimate, in 2016, total owners’ subsidies to their 
TV channels were between 600 and 700 million USD (Kalnysh 2017: 166; it is unclear 
whether this refers to the main four oligarchic media holdings or all TV channels). This 
radical dependence of media businesses on owners in Ukraine, and the kinds of occu-
pational control and (self‐ )censorship that result from it (Fedirko 2020), give a partic-
ular form to the tension between journalists’ dependent wage labour, and their 
idealisation of independent creative work, that media scholars have argued generally 
characterises news production under capitalism (e.g. Champagne 2005; Lebovic 2014).
The media reform movement traces its origins to the mid‐ 1990s when western 
donors and numerous philanthropic foundations2 began to support liberalising initia-
tives in the media sector. Organisationally, the movement has coalesced from groups 
with distinct positional interests (primarily elite broadcast reporters, national broad-
sheet journalists and editors, and staff of foreign grant‐ supported watchdog and media 
1 State Statistics Service of Ukraine: ‘Profitability of operating and all activities of enterprises by type 
of economic activity with a breakdown on large, medium, small and microenterprises in 2010– 2019’. 
(https://ukrst at.org/uk/opera tiv/menu/menu_u/sze_20.htm) Accessed 7 April 2021.
2 E.g. American, British, German, Danish, EU, French, Japanese and Swedish development agencies 
and foreign ministries, and George Soros’ Open Society Foundation and Renaissance Foundation, 
the Omidyar Network, etc.
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training organisations3) through a series of coordinated mobilisations in 2002– 4 and 
2010– 13. These were initially directed against government censorship, and eventually 
came to focus on the ‘corrupt national media sphere dominated by oligarchs with 
political interests’ (Internews 2019: 5). Each of these mobilisations sought to establish 
coordinating institutions and expand its organisational basis: from lobbying to regulate 
hidden political advertising, to establishing trade unions, employers’ associations, pro-
fessional ethics bodies4 and, more recently, a number of nezalezhni media (‘indepen-
dent’, i.e. non‐ oligarchic‐ controlled, media).5 But as these efforts failed to change the 
political economy of media in which wealthy patrons exercised instrumental influence 
on editorial agendas, the movement has increasingly sought to change journalists 
themselves. It has emphasised a vision of journalism as a self‐ regulating profession, at 
the core of which was the figure of an uncompromising professional subject bound by 
common standards and personal vocation to serve public interest.
Media monitoring and training organisations have focused on promoting what media 
scholars call the ‘liberal’ or ‘Anglo‐ American’ model of journalism (Hallin and Mancini 
2004) within the profession, which emphasises nonpartisanship, empiricism and balance in 
reporting, and journalists’ ‘detachment from direct involvement in news events’, among 
other traits (Bishara 2013: 38; see also Chalaby 1998; Schudson 1981). These procedural 
ideals express a markedly liberal commitment to public rationality to be achieved through 
science‐ like mechanical objectivity of reporting (cf. Daston and Galison 2007; Schudson 
1981: 77– 87), and a vision of both journalists and their audience as rational autonomous 
individuals navigating public life on the basis of facts. In Ukraine, these ideals have crystal-
lised as a set of professional norms often referred to as the ‘BBC standards’: balance of opin-
ions and points of view, speed, truthfulness, separation of facts from value‐ judgements, 
accuracy and ‘comprehensiveness’ (vycherpnist’) of news reports.6 These standards became 
the cornerstone of the media reform movements’ training programmes; new, prestigious 
graduate schools of journalism7 incorporated them in their curricula. In their turn, nezale-
zhni media have provided organisational infrastructure within which to pursue the vision of 
journalism subordinated to nothing else but impersonal standards of profession.
Hromadske TV, one of the media funded almost exclusively by European and 
American institutional donors, was ‘launched [in 2013] by a group of journalists who 
were disillusioned with journalism in Ukraine and tired of political interference in their 
work’8 and who ‘disagreed with the controlled subordination [pidkontrol’nist’] of 
most Ukrainian media’. The organisation played an important role in covering and 
promoting the Euromaidan protests, and has since paid much attention to post‐ 
revolutionary liberal reforms and human rights issues. But their liberal orientation is 
also well captured by their foundational opposition to ‘oligarchic’ media:
3 E.g. Detector Media, Institute for Mass Information, Regional Press Development Institute.
4 Such as the Commission on Journalism Ethics and the Independent Media Council.
5 Hromadske TV and Hromadske Radio, the Ukrainian Public Broadcasting Corporation and 
Zaborona, among others.
6 See https://imi.org.ua/artic les/stand arti‐ jurna listi ki‐ osnov i‐ profe siyno sti‐ chi‐ zasta rili‐ ramki ‐ i178 
(accessed 2 October 2020).
7 One at the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, the other at the Kyiv Mohyla Academy National 
University.
8 https://biggg gidea.com/proje ct/392/blog/185/ (accessed 2 October 2020).
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The Ukrainian media landscape is practically monopolised by commercial chan-
nels which belong to oligarchs. Hromadske is an attempt to change the media 
market. We believe that in this way we can influence the political milieu, which 
has been formed by organisations with values that are far removed from serving 
the interests of the public.9
In a similar tone, a recent subscription advertisement from Novoe Vremia (NV), a 
staunchly liberal weekly owned by a Czech financier, said: ‘Oligarchs pay for the dis-
semination of information beneficial to them. NV subscribers pay for the truth.’ In this 
‘classification struggle’ (Bourdieu 2018) for the meaning of ‘proper’, ‘truthful’ jour-
nalism (Hromadske TV’s slogan: ‘What really happens’), nezalezhni media position 
their brands and frame their reporting in direct opposition to mainstream commer-
cial media. Privately, many reporters from nezalezhni media do not consider those 
working for mainstream media as their colleagues. Indeed, in February 2021, when 
President Zelenskyi issued a decree that effectively shut down three all‐ news TV chan-
nels connected to Viktor Medvedchuk, a minor oligarch and prominent opposition 
politician, on the grounds of Medvedchuk’s alleged ties with the Kremlin, many of my 
interlocutors supported Zelenskyi’s move because in their opinion those TV channels 
did not produce ‘real journalism’ anyway.
The stark, one‐ sided way in which these avowed liberals formulate what they 
stand for, in opposition to the allegedly illiberal other, is perhaps unsurprising given 
the long tradition of defining liberty in negative terms, in Ukraine and elsewhere 
(Humphrey 2007). It evokes a familiar critique: namely, that the exclusion of illiberal 
others is constitutive of liberal projects and formations (Dzenovska 2018; Povinelli 
2006; Losurdo 2014). Such critique pierces the veil of liberal ideals by demonstrat-
ing how liberal exclusion betrays the practical incoherence of liberal ideals (Candea 
2021). But we might also question whether such exclusion necessarily delineates the 
‘borders’ of liberalism. I propose that when thinking about the shape and constitution 
of actually‐ existing liberal formations in Ukraine and other contexts where liberalism 
is not hegemonic, we should not reproduce liberal activists’ exclusion of those who 
do not conform to their visions of the ‘grammar’ of liberal practice (Fedirko et al. 
2021). We should be able to account for the fact that liberal ideas gain purchase not just 
among groups directly involved in projects of liberal reform and rule, which establish 
specific institutions for realising their ideals, but also among people who are excluded 
or opposed by such institutions, and who might nevertheless rework and reproduce 
elements thereof in ways that suggest a more fragmented liberalism than activist liber-
als would like to acknowledge. This is why I now turn to the case of an editor‐ censor 
at a TV channel owned by one Ukraine’s richest people.
‘ A n  i n f o r m a t i o n  s p o r t s  c h a m p i o n ’
‘This was a beautiful Cinderella tale’, Svitlana10 said, explaining that her path in 
journalism began when a friend bet her a bottle of sparkling that ‘anyone could land a 
9 https://biggg gidea.com/proje ct/392/ (accessed 2 October 2020).
10 All names and other identifying details have been changed to protect anonymity. I have also changed 
the name of the channel Svitlana worked for, and identifying details of the channel’s owner.
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job at a local radio’. It was 2000, and Ukraine was entering a period of economic growth 
after the first post‐ Soviet decade saw the country’s GDP shrink by more than 40% 
(Yurchenko 2017). Svitlana was in her late teens and had recently enrolled at a univer-
sity in her hometown in Western Ukraine. Winning the bet, Svitlana ‘by pure chance’ 
inaugurated what became a successful career in broadcasting, a career that tied her 
fortunes to those of Ukraine’s rising oligarchs during a decade when they rapidly 
expanded their media assets while profiting from privatisation of Ukraine’s industry 
and infrastructure.
At the time of our conversation, Svitlana was in her mid‐ 30s. With 17 years of 
broadcasting experience, she was a veteran in Kyiv’s youthful media profession, which 
most join before they turn 20 and leave by their early 30s. We met in late October 2017 
when on Svitlana’s invitation I came to a private journalism school where she taught 
on weekends. The school was a subsidiary of one of the large oligarch‐ owned media 
holding companies. We spoke between Svitlana’s classes, while her students worked 
in a studio next door on their first news bulletin. Our conversation meandering, 
Svitlana switched between different points of view and voices, high and low registers of 
Ukrainian and Russian, as if to demonstrate in front of me was an experienced reporter 
in full control of the polyphonic possibilities of language, even when reporting the 
facts of her own life. Having moved to the capital shortly before the 2013– 14 Maidan 
protests, she quit reporting to become an Output Editor of Evening News at Channel 
3, quickly progressing to Head of Day and Evening News, ‘number two’ (as she put it) 
in the news department. By now, she quipped, she was ‘an information sports cham-
pion despite being too short and not very old’. The ‘story’ of her career, she said, was 
about more than just favourable opportunities: ‘I could have stayed in my home town, 
kicking trolleybus doors open, knowing that I am a star and that everyone recognises 
me. […] All of us have equal opportunities. All of us. [But] It’s a question of the effort 
that you put in.’ She said that by now it was ‘difficult to impress’ her ‘with anything in 
the news genre’. She thought herself a skilled organiser and a team player who looked 
out for those working with her. Loyalty from her staff, Svitlana said, was for her an 
important ‘achievement’.
The story she told me juxtaposed the arbitrariness of ‘pure chance’ that brought 
her into journalism with the hard work that propelled her career. Against the backdrop 
of matters of chance and nature outside of her control, Svitlana’s meritocratic achieve-
ment came forth all the more clearly. Competent, impartial, pragmatic and individual-
istic, in control of herself and her destiny, and committed to her profession and skilled 
in her work, Svitlana cut a figure familiar from ethnographic depictions of journal-
ists (e.g. Hasty 2005) and other middle‐ class professionals across the world (Bledstein 
1976; Lamont 1992; McClay 1994; Yarrow 2019).
After the interview, Svitlana offered me to observe her class. It was the last session 
that day; students had to present their first news programme. Supposed to ‘go on air’ 
at 4 pm, they were late, and after giving them an extra 10 minutes (which did not save 
the programme), Svitlana gathered everyone in the classroom. With the unfinished 
news bulletin on pause on a large screen behind her, she urged everyone to analyse their 
mistakes: ‘Why wasn’t the programme ready on time? […] Now, turn off your justifi-
cations, let’s look at this situation in a detached way [podniavshys’ so storony, lit., hav-
ing risen above it and stepped aside].’ She wrote students’ replies on a flipchart: ‘bad 
division of responsibilities’, ‘technical failure’, ‘irresponsibility’, ‘lack of knowledge’, 
‘inability to listen to others’, ‘disorganisation’. Admonishing the students to be ‘adult’, 
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Svitlana was asking them to hold back their pride and shame, and to separate what they 
had done from who they are: this lesson in journalism began with a lesson about work 
as an alienable possession. ‘You had the confidence that you are great and will produce 
the programme on time. Self‐ confidence lets us down.’ They failed at teamwork, she 
insisted, not only because they had failed to ‘listen’ to each other with respect, but also 
because they did not take individual responsibility for their tasks and failures. Svitlana’s 
lesson created an occasion for self‐ reflection and ‘work on the self’11 through which 
the students would learn the attributes of good professionalism: individual responsibil-
ity, rationality, humility, transparency and detachment. While such professionalism 
demanded transcending the uniqueness of one’s personality, this was to be achieved 
through a quintessentially liberal exercise in ‘self‐ possession’ which was framed as ulti-
mately amplifying one’s capacity to realise their unique self (Boyer 2013: 132– 6; 
MacPherson 1962; Povinelli 2006).
In the figure of the good professional sketched by Svitlana’s story of her career 
and her directions to her students, we can see an outline of a generic liberal subject. 
In what follows, I will dwell on this in more detail. First, however, a brief note on the 
notion of the subject that I use. The anthropological literature on subjectivity and per-
sonhood has long been attuned to the tension between the singularity of the biograph-
ical individual and the multiplicity, complexity and fluidity of the social personae and 
images of self that the individual can inhabit and form durable attachments to (Ortner 
2005; Humphrey 2008). The different cultural ways of being a person might be rei-
fied and institutionalised (e.g. the rights‐ bearing individual of the human rights dis-
course); assumed by forms of relatedness (Povinelli 2006), constructed in interaction 
or through practices of production and consumption, or formulated by technologies 
and discourses with which we interact. They might circulate as more or less detailed, 
more or less prescriptive, typified images of the self. Finally, they might be mixed and 
combined with one another (Ong 1999; Dunn 2004; Boyer 2013).
The ‘liberal subject’ spans all of these possibilities: what makes it liberal is a set 
of attributes commonly associated with the polyphonic liberal tradition, but the 
configurations of these attributes remain particular to the peculiar ‘distributions’ of 
personhood. There is, in other words, no one liberal subjectivity, no one way to be 
a liberal subject. On the one hand, historical liberalisms centred on distinct configu-
rations of personhood. As Asif Agha (2011) notes, classic liberal political theory of 
the 17th to mid‐ 19th centuries had at its core the possessive individual (MacPherson 
1962) which historically gathered ‘to itself more and more naturalised figures of 
autonomy, including, with Kant, transcendent criteria of rationality and free will’ 
(Agha 2011: 178). This ‘figure of personhood’, as Agha calls it, was de‐ emphasised 
in varieties of liberalism that founded their political and economic visions not in 
individual autonomy, but in other values, for instance, solidarity (Freeden 2009). 
On the other, as ‘persons may be distributed in more ways than one’ (Graber 2015: 
357), the liberal subject ‘lives’ through other figures of personhood, such as the 
professional self, which refract and encode particular liberal values in relation to 
relevant traits of the subject (cf. Lempert 2012). These figures of personhood exist 
in semiotic interaction and interpretation: they might but do not have to be rec-
ognised explicitly as such; the liberal subject can be internalised (to varying degrees; 
11 See Matza (2012, 2018) on the specificity of middle‐ class ‘self‐ work’ in postsocialist Russia.
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Agha 2007b: 334; 2007a: 233– 54), but can also be performed, integrated with other 
personae or merely ascribed, as when they become reference points in ethical judge-
ments about oneself or others. In this sense, liberal subject, and liberal culture more 
broadly, are akin to a repertoire (or a set of repertoires) on which actors draw, per-
haps not even consciously, as they fashion and narrate various aspects of their life, 
and as they comment on other people’s behaviour, as Svitlana did (Swidler 2001). 
Understanding this is crucial for grasping how liberal culture pervades contexts that 
avowed media liberals consider inimical to liberal governance.
‘ T h i s  i s  n o t  a  r o l e -  p l a y ’
Having discussed the mistakes in the production process, Svitlana moved on to 
the news programme itself. She paused the news bulletin every 20 or 30 seconds to 
comment on the reporter’s demeanour, the use of language, video editing, script, etc. 
One of the news stories was an explainer about strokes prepared by a student called 
Vera. At a shot of Vera’s standup,12 Svitlana paused and turned to Vera, who was 
sitting right in front of her: ‘Oh, who’s this doctor? Weren’t you a journalist just 
now?’ The shot showed Vera in a white medical coat, standing in a hospital corridor. 
‘But hospital staff asked me to wear one!’ protested Vera. ‘Listen,’ Svitlana said, ‘this 
is not a role‐ play. We don’t cross‐ dress as firefighters, we don’t dress as policemen. 
We are not participants in events.’ Svitlana resumed the video. ‘… in most cases the 
illness can be avoided. So, let’s take care of one another and watch our health’, said 
the reporter on the screen.
Svitlana: ‘The standup is badly edited. [There is] A call to the viewer. We must 
not issue calls to the viewer.
Vera: So why does TSN [a popular news programme] say, ‘Let’s take care of our-
selves’ or some such?
Svitlana: The news anchor says that, my dear, not the reporter!
Svitlana drew attention to the link between a way of speaking or presentation and a 
social persona indicated by it. Criticising redundant language, the reporter’s lack of 
detachment from the situation around her as well as her co‐ involvement with the audi-
ence as a member of the same public, Svitlana was working through the perspectives 
and positions implied by the report. The liberal norm of journalistic neutrality required 
the reporter to demonstrate her objective detachment, both by not wearing the lab 
coat and by not exhorting the viewers. If, in criticising the production process earlier, 
Svitlana articulated a generic vision of a professional person, now she was developing 
that vision in relation to specifically liberal values of news journalism, around which 
the Ukrainian media reformers also built their movement. Similarly to Svitlana’s own 
narrative of professional growth, the different aspects of professionalism that Svitlana 
taught during the class were underpinned by a composite figure of the liberal subject 
12 Standup, or stendap in Ukrainian, is a shot in which a reporter standing in front of the camera nar-
rates the story.
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as the professional journalist, or perhaps of the journalistic professional as a particular 
configuration of the liberal subject.
Genealogically related to early modern understandings of scientific objectivity and 
individual autonomy of the gentleman‐ scientist (Bishara 2013; Shapin 1999), the lib-
eral ‘occupational ideology’ (Deuze 2005) of journalism has evolved in Britain and the 
USA around the twin epistemic virtues of objectivity and distance (Anderson 2001, 
2016; Daston and Galison 2007; Schudson 1981), which in turn guaranteed the political 
virtue of the journalist’s public service. For my interlocutors across the Kyiv jour-
nalistic scene, something as trivial as donning a medical coat could indicate a danger-
ous contraction of the epistemic distance between the reporter and the reported. Not 
addressing the viewers, eschewing emotions, evaluations and direct appeals, as Svitlana 
compelled Vera to do, also created space for viewers to make autonomous judgement 
based on facts. BBC correspondents on training missions in Ukraine who I spoke to 
were taken aback by the strictness of their Ukrainian colleagues’ interpretations of 
what they took to be globally common standards of professionalism. But such ethical 
and epistemic rigidity should perhaps not be surprising in a context where news is 
frequently instrumentalised for political purposes, and reporters and audiences remain 
vigilant for signs of potential bias.
‘ Yo u  h a v e  o n l y  o n e  v i e w e r ’
Liberal ideals of journalistic professionalism have a reach in Ukraine that goes beyond 
the few independent media organisations: Svitlana’s students were learning the same 
profession as that practised at Hromadske TV or other nezalezhni media. Moreover, 
they did so at a private journalism school owned by one of the oligarchic media hold-
ings. But what the students probably did not know was how routinely these very ideals 
of objectivity, impartiality and truthfulness were breached in news programmes edited 
by Svitlana.
Svitlana’s career unfolded within media organisations owned by politicians and 
businessmen with political interests, most recently at Channel 3, a major TV channel 
belonging to one of Ukraine’s richest people, billionaire ‘Ivan Antonov’. At Channel 
3, Svitlana oversaw news bulletins full of censored stories, character assassinations and 
praise for Antonov’s businesses. She joined the channel just when the management 
were seeking to reform the news team as part of an attempt to increase their audience 
share. Svitlana embraced the challenge. Svitlana’s one‐ time colleague, an output editor 
I will call Olga, praised Svitlana for the care she took of her team: ‘Svitlana was always 
very self‐ directed, always said that journalistic staff had to be changed, developed, 
taught, that they had to be paid good money etc.’ For Svitlana, the goal was to attract 
good professionals, to build a team where ‘80% of people working with me sincerely 
profess those ideas [posytsii, lit. positions] that we broadcast to the masses. While of 
course understanding that there is a side wind that has to be taken into account.’
Svitlana was quickly promoted to Head of Day and Evening News, which, Olga 
said, came with new responsibilities:
Head of Day News sends reporters on assignments, talks through their stories, 
edits them. But in fact, all these people [in the editorial positions] are there to 
channel down the necessary information [spuskaty neobkhidnu informatsiiu] to 
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the programme staff they manage, so that a wrong person is not shown on air, so 
that the right one [potribna] is […]. This is, in essence, an extra function; we used 
to call it the ‘entry point’ [tochka vkhodu].
As an ‘entry point’, Olga said, Svitlana turned directives ‘from above’ – the ‘side wind’ 
– into tasks for reporters, programme and video editors. Just as the poststructuralist 
‘new censorship’ theorists have argued (e.g. Bunn 2015; Schimpfössl et al. 2020), here 
the editorial and censorial work were difficult to separate. Olga continued: ‘The chief 
editor would come up to Svitlana and whisper something into her ear, or ping her an 
email, and then she’d come to us saying: “Take that out; put this in”.’ Olga and her 
colleagues eventually learned to leave ‘five or ten minutes’ in the news programmes 
unslotted to accommodate any last‐ minute additions, such as stories featuring particu-
lar politicians that ‘had to be inserted’ into the news bulletin.
As Olga put it, Channel 3 news ‘serviced the companies’ of Ivan Antonov. 
Whenever a journalist on her shift produced a story that featured issues pertinent to 
one of Antonov’s companies, Olga said, the report would be checked with the compa-
ny’s press office. Sometimes, the companies had a side production crews make reports 
to be placed into the channels’ news programme. Kostia, another former editor who 
had worked under Svitlana’s management, found this preferable: ‘at least they wouldn’t 
distract my journalists’ into reporting on Antonov’s businesses.
Stories that ‘serviced’ Antonov’s interests were only a proportion of the news 
covered by Olga and Kostia’s programme; and even with ‘ordered’ reports [zamovni 
novyny] there was room for manoeuvre. Still, Olga said she was ‘very ashamed’ of her 
work: ‘When people asked me where I worked … I felt for some reason that everyone 
knew […] what shit I produced.’ Having worked for less than a year at the channel, 
Kostia left for a job at Hromadske TV that was more demanding, paid less, came with 
no extra welfare benefits, but where there was ‘freedom’ (svoboda; see Humphrey 
2007) from censorial, and indeed editorial, interventions. Soon after, Olga was fired 
after she unwittingly ran a report featuring a politician who had broken away from 
a faction that represented Antonov’s interests in the Parliament. According to Olga, 
Svitlana, who was supposed to vet the programme, was on leave that day, and Olga did 
not know that the politician had been ‘blacklisted’ at the channel. Olga said Antonov, 
who personally watched the programme, ordered to fire the entire production team, 
and when Svetlana protested to higher management saying ‘What about the viewers?’, 
she was told: ‘You have only one viewer.’
Svitlana, who fell out of grace after this incident, remained vague about her 
employment status in our interview, telling me she’d left her editorial post for a ‘proj-
ect’ within the same media company. Still, she made little effort to conceal the aspects 
of her work that many others would have preferred not to disclose. She spoke at length 
about how she sought to deflect and mitigate Antonov’s influence, which often reached 
her through ‘suggestions’ from the chief editor. For her, these were practical hurdles to 
be approached pragmatically:
We are all adults and twice a month get a salary notification from the bank. And 
we all understand that as long as a TV channel has an owner, he [sic] will call the 
tune. Particularly if the owner has business interests. That’s been the case wher-
ever I worked. […] The question is, first of all, how disgusted you are by what 
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you are offered to do. And second, to what extent you can package this into an 
adequate form.
During our interview, Svitlana demonstrated how she ‘packaged’ requests into 
‘adequate form’. She reached for her laptop, and after a minute of searching 
through her files, put on a news report for us to watch. It began by telling of the 
damages caused by mass‐ scale theft of cast iron manhole covers by scrap collec-
tors in Kyiv, and led up to a brief interview with a Member of Parliament promot-
ing the idea of regulating scrap exports. ‘The MP says’, the story ended, ‘that a bill 
setting quotas for the export of scrap metal is already in the Parliament. [It pro-
poses] To sell abroad only 20% of the volume [of scrap] used by Ukrainian smelt-
ers. This will help improve supply and lower the price of metal. Which ultimately 
means that fewer manhole covers will be stolen.’ I would later learn that when the 
bill was originally proposed, there had been a severe shortage of scrap, a valuable 
raw material for iron smelters, because much of the scrap harvested in Ukraine 
was exported to Transistria and Turkey. This harmed the interests of Antonov’s 
and other oligarchs’ iron smelters, major players in the metallurgical industry 
which, according to industry estimates, accounts for about 12% of the country’s 
GDP and around one‐ fourth of total exports.13 The bill was eventually passed in 
an altered form in 2016, leading to a 24% increase in scrap supply to Ukrainian 
smelters in 2016– 18, and a 37% growth of production volume in the Ukrainian 
electrometallurgical industry that is heavily reliant on scrap inputs.14 Svitlana thus 
did not need to explicate the obvious: not only did the story concern Antonov’s 
businesses, but the only person chosen for commentary belonged to a political 
party who lobbied for Antonov’s interests in the parliament and received favour-
able news coverage from Channel 3, and allegedly also hidden payments from 
Antonov, in return. Based on average world steel prices in 2016– 17, one can esti-
mate that if the extra steel produced in the first year following the levy was 
exported, as it probably was, Antonov’s and others’ electrometallurgical plants 
received ca. 200 million USD in extra revenues – a very imprecise figure, which 
nevertheless gives an idea of that stakes of lobbying oligarchs’ interests in the 
Ukrainian parliament and media.
‘You see, we’ve crossed a grass snake with a hedgehog here’, Svitlana said when the 
video ended, borrowing a line from an old joke. ‘We’ve satisfied politicians, and we’ve 
satisfied the demand of metallurgists for regulating scrap exports. And the story, after 
all, is good too.’ I agreed, the report was indeed done well: it took an issue of public 
concern, discussed it from several perspectives and led the viewer to a possible resolu-
tion. ‘This is about communication’, she explained. ‘We sit down with the journalists 
… And I’ve always been and will be honest with them. Guys, we have to do this. So 
please, do this in such a way that you won’t be ashamed to put your name to it at the 
end. So when you give them this freedom without imposing on them how to do it, […] 
you can get a decent result.’ At another moment in the interview, she explained:
13 https://gmk.cente r/en/infog raphi c/minin g‐ metal s‐ compa nies‐ gener ate‐ every ‐ eight h‐ hryvn ia‐ of‐ 
ukrai ne‐ s‐ gdp/ (accessed 12 June 2021).
14 Data according to Ukrmetprom, an industry association (http://www.ukrme tprom.org/podvo dim‐ 
itogi ‐ dvukh ‐ let‐ rabot y‐ poshl in/) Accessed 2 October 2020.
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You have two options: either […] to say, ‘Ok!’ [or … ] offer another story: 
instead of showing a politician kissing a cow, you can propose a story about the 
problems of farmers forced to sell their milk cheaply. And then […] introduce 
the necessary [potribne] interview. This way you get to have your cake and eat it. 
Is this information publicly important? It is. Is the relevant guy inserted there? 
He is. Is everyone happy? Everyone’s happy. Is this a compromise? It is. But it’s 
one that hasn’t damaged the viewer.
Many of my interlocutors among the employees of Hromadske TV and other neza-
lezhni media would call Svitlana’s ‘compromise’ self‐ censorship (Fedirko 2020). And 
it was clear that Svitlana herself did not like the various ‘necessities’ of her profession. 
Yet, in her rationalisation of her predicament she insisted: ‘This is, in a sense, about 
creativity [tvorchist’] and a certain freedom of action [svoboda dii].’
Remarkably, Svitlana spoke about her pragmatic choices and skilled manoeuvring 
that preserved her autonomy in the face of managerial ‘requests’, within the same 
coordinates within which she criticised the work of her students, and within which 
many of my interlocutors within nezalezhni media would criticise her own work as 
inimical to professional journalism. If, for my interlocutors from nezalezhni media, 
the path to anti‐ oligarchic reform began with individual journalists’ acceptance of 
the first principles of liberal media professionalism, Svitlana’s case demonstrates that 
such professional visions might have a more complex relation to newswork than the 
liberals would expect. Svitlana presented herself as someone committed to informing 
the public, and forced by that commitment to work against unfortunate constraints 
at Channel 3 that nevertheless gave her an opportunity to bring important news to 
millions of people every day. She thought that those who left ‘oligarchic’ channels for 
media outlets such as Hromadske TV, or for non‐ media jobs, were naïve: too ‘rigid, 
aggressive, non‐ conformist’ to be able to ‘communicate well with others’: ‘Those who 
say, “I’ve refused to work” [at an oligarchic channel] – well, great, it means you’re 
tired of your profession. Your task is to broadcast information [donosyty informatsiiu]. 
Any information is important.’ And to do that task well – to be able to do it with all 
the resources of the mainstream television, ‘Something has to be sacrificed because 
it’s a normal thing. […] There is 15 or 20% of information that we are forced to show 
[vymusheni pokazuvaty] to be able to show the rest.’
C o n c l u s i o n :  ‘ a c t u a l l y  ex i s t i n g ’  l i b e r a l i s m ,  l i b e r a l i s m  i n 
f r a g m e n t s
The dilemmas with which Svitlana and many other Ukrainian reporters and editors 
grapple encapsulate the general contradiction between the globally circulating liberal 
norms of journalistic work and the structural conditions under which such work, as 
dependent wage labour, takes place (Champagne 2005; Lebovic 2016; Roudakova 
2017). If living this contradiction some of my interlocutors in Kyiv became cynical or 
demoralised, and others left the profession or sought out employment within the small 
sector of nezalezhni media, Svitlana opted for compromise. In so doing, she drew on 
the powerful cultural repertoire of the liberal vision of professional journalistic self to 
navigate and rationalise the limits on her autonomy that she encountered in her daily 
work. Svitlana balanced ideals of autonomous creativity and public vocation with the 
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practical accommodation of censorial instructions, to realise a vision of public‐ service 
professionalism that was both at odds with that of the liberal media reform movement 
and reproduced some of the key elements of the reformer’s ideology.
By focusing on Svitlana’s engagement with the figure of autonomous journalist as 
a particular configuration of the liberal subject in Ukraine, I have explored one aspect 
of actually‐ existing liberalisms, namely, the way that these social formations are con-
stituted through uneven institutionalisation of various elements of liberal ideology. I 
outlined how liberal ideas of journalistic professionalism, ‘transferred’ into and taken 
up in Ukraine as part of a larger postsocialist project of liberal modernisation, were 
elaborated in a context of a movement for media reform. This movement responded to 
the oligarchic predicament of Ukraine’s postsocialist capitalism by seeking to establish 
a network of organisations within which it would be possible to realise their vision of 
good journalism as fully as possible. I then analysed in detail how people like Svitlana 
take up, rework and reproduce this vision in surprising ways, giving it a new life in the 
context of a media organisation against which this kind of vision was directed in the 
first instance.
To appreciate the complexity of this case, and to account for reception and trans-
formation of liberal ideas beyond contexts where they are more ‘thickly’ institution-
alised or indeed hegemonic, we need to learn to see liberalism in fragments (cf. Lempert 
2012). First, in fragments in the sense of being incomplete. One powerful critique of 
liberalism points to how liberal aspirations fall short of their goals, how they are fragile, 
inconsistent, violent and exclusionary (e.g. Povinelli 2006; Losurdo 2014; also Candea 
2021). In contrast, the orientation towards a fragmentary character of liberalism(s) 
requires recognising inconsistency and contradiction not as utmost liberal failures, but 
as an inextricable aspect of liberal lives and liberal formations. It prompts us to take 
supporters of liberal ideology seriously: for instance, as engaged in sincere efforts to 
better the world and producing violent forms of exclusion; as cynically deploying the 
language of freedom in order to advance their interests, and opening a space for self‐ 
realisation, and so on. Taking the ‘‐ ism’ out of liberalism, in the sense of deflating lib-
eral claims to coherence and universalism, this regained sense of complexity ultimately 
makes for a more powerful critique of contradictions of actually‐ existing liberalisms. 
It allows us to better grasp the different ways in which liberal ideologies operate, as for 
instance through cultural models of personhood that inform both liberals’ ethical lives 
and their justifications of illiberal practices.
Second, in fragments in the sense of being a composite of multiple elements: some-
times, perhaps, a hegemonic, all‐ encompassing social and cultural order; but more 
often, a set of disarticulated, partial orders, single institutions or cultural structures, 
or indeed figures of personhood disjointed from structures and contexts in which they 
can be fully realised. This brings liberal social formations into view as composites of 
fragments whose integration with one another or with other non‐ liberal elements, and 
whose grounding in particular forms of social organisation, is an open empirical ques-
tion. Some of these liberal fragments, such as the professional norms of journalism, 
might travel ‘as a set of already elaborated arguments’ (Sartori 2014: 4). Others, such 
as the liberal subject in its different configurations, might be encoded in a plethora of 
forms of relatedness and figures of personhood (e.g. that of the autonomous profes-
sional) whether they ‘travel’ globally, or emerge locally.
To see Ukrainian media liberalism from this perspective is to go beyond asser-
tions that the liberal reformers, who are dependent on the support of their Western 
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backers and lack broad public legitimacy, and Svitlana, who upholds the oligarchic 
media machine with her pragmatic compromises, are evidence of Ukraine’s incom-
plete ‘transition’ to liberal democratic political culture, or of internal incoherence of 
liberalism more generally. To see liberalism in fragments is to understand that, in the 
contradictory force field of the global empire of capital, both the reformers and those 
whom they seek to reform are part of the same actually‐ existing liberalism.
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Le libéralisme en fragments: l’oligarchie et le 
sujet libéral dans le journalisme ukrainien
Cet article explore la place de la subjectivité libérale dans la culture professionnelle des jour-
nalistes ukrainiens afin d’analyser un processus plus général par lequel les idées liberals sont 
transférées des contextes du libéralisme hégémonique au coeur du système capitaliste mondial, 
vers ses marges postsocialistes. Je décris comment certains idéaux anglo‐ américains de bonne 
pratique journalistique, qui codent les traits de la subjectivité libérale, sont empruntés et élaborés 
par un mouvement financé par l’Occident pour une réforme libérale anti‐ oligarchique du jour-
nalisme ukrainien ; et j’examine comment ces idéaux sont repris dans les médias contrôlés par les 
oligarques, un contexte que les réformateurs considèrent comme hostile au libéralisme. À travers 
le portrait ethnographique d’une rédactrice‐ correctrice d’une grande chaîne de télévision ukrain-
ienne détenue par des oligarques, j’analyse la façon dont elle retravaille ces idéaux professionnels 
de manière à soutenir le patronage oligarchique et à étendre la portée du libéralisme en Ukraine. 
Cela révèle comment, dans le champ de forces contradictoires du capitalisme mondial, les réfor-
mateurs et ceux qu’ils cherchent à reformer font partie du même libéralisme existant. Je propose 
que pour mieux comprendre des cas comme celui‐ ci, nous devions apprendre à voir le libéralisme 
par fragments : comme toujours partiel et incomplet, et comme constitué d’éléments multiples.
Mots- clés journalisme, oligarchie, libéralisme, sujet liberal, Ukraine
